MOTION Doc # 28 FOR ORDER TO RELEASE 12% OF SURPLUS FUNDS TO APPOINTED SURPLUS TRUSTEE AND BALANCE TO FORMER PROPERTY OWNER FILED BY PALADIN FINANCIAL June 11, 2019 (2024)

Related Contentin Pinellas County

Case

IN RE: PATRICIA RUBSAMEN

Jul 15, 2024 |DEPOSIT WILL |DEPOSIT WILL |24-007150-ES

Case

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF JUANITA WATKINS

Jul 15, 2024 |CAMPBELL, PAMELA A |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION UNDER $1000 |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION UNDER $1000 |24-007187-ES

Case

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF DENNIS FELDKAMP

Jul 16, 2024 |COLEMAN, SHERWOOD |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OVER $1000 |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OVER $1000 |24-007219-ES

Case

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF MARY ELLEN MERKLE

Jul 16, 2024 |COLEMAN, SHERWOOD |FORMAL ADMINISTRATION |FORMAL ADMINISTRATION |24-007200-ES

Case

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM J ANDERSON

Jul 19, 2024 |CAMPBELL, PAMELA A |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OVER $1000 |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OVER $1000 |24-007320-ES

Case

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF LOIS COPPERMAN

Jul 16, 2024 |COLEMAN, SHERWOOD |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OVER $1000 |SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OVER $1000 |24-007203-ES

Case

IN RE: KATHY MALONE

Jul 18, 2024 |REQUIRED, NO JUDGE |CAVEAT BY CREDITOR |CAVEAT BY CREDITOR |24-007259-ES

Case

IN RE: BARBARA K FIELER

Jul 16, 2024 |DEPOSIT WILL |DEPOSIT WILL |24-007184-ES

Case

IN RE: TONI A PALM-CROW

Jul 18, 2024 |DEPOSIT WILL |DEPOSIT WILL |24-007258-ES

Ruling

EASTGROUP PROPERTIES, L.P., A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs...

Jul 18, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Unlawful Detainer/Commercial ...) |24CV066545

24CV066545: EASTGROUP PROPERTIES, L.P., A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs WMT LOGISTICS INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by WMT LOGISTICS INC., a California corporation (Defendant) in Department 511Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Sarah Sandford-SmithThe motion of attorney Servando R. Sandoval, of Spencer Fane LLP, to be relieved as counsel ofrecord for Defendant WMT Logistics Inc. pursuant to CCP § 284(2) and Rule of Court 3.1362, isDROPPED.The motion to be relieved as counsel is moot. Counsel filed and served the motion on June 6,2024. The motion was set for hearing on July 18, 2024. The Court, however, granted counsel’srequest to be relieved as counsel on June 20, 2024, when Defendant’s principal failed to appearfor court trial.Counsel for Defendant shall promptly prepare and file a Proposed Order to reflect theproceedings on June 20, 2024. The Proposed Order must comply with Rule 3.1362(e). Counselshall then promptly file and serve the notice of entry of order. The order shall not be effectiveuntil counsel files proof of service of the order on Defendant WMT Logistics Inc.

Ruling

Wilkinson vs. Wilkinson, et al.

Jul 19, 2024 |23CV-0202523

WILKINSON VS. WILKINSON, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202523This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The matter is at issue. The Court designates this matter as a Plan IIcase and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. The parties are ordered to meet andconfer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for a court trial. An appearance is necessary on today’scalendar.

Ruling

Eckelman, et al. vs. OLCO, Inc

Jul 16, 2024 |23CV-0202690

ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INCCase Number: 23CV-0202690This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates thismatter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties areordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessaryon today’s calendar.

Ruling

FRANKLIN vs BANK OF AMERICA, N.,A.

Jul 16, 2024 |CVRI2402331

Ruling

MOUNTAINFIELD P01, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS CHRISTIAN TOXBOE, ET AL.

Jul 15, 2024 |6/18/2022 |24SMCV01349

Case Number: 24SMCV01349 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: I The unopposed motion to strike the answer is GRANTED. Defendant has 10 court days to file an answer that conforms to law, meaning that it is filed by and signed by counsel. After that, a default may be taken.

Ruling

ZHENYA HE VS YING CHEN, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |Echo Dawn Ryan |23AHCV00325

Case Number: 23AHCV00325 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 26 7/18/24 Dept. 26 Rolf Treu, Judge presiding Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al. (21STCV09634) DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE CROSS-COMPLAINT (Filed by Cross-Defendants Maggie Ly Sien and Real Estate Elite Corporation on February 14, 2024) Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al. (23AHCV00325) DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Filed by Defendants Maggie Ly Sien and Real Estate Elite Corporation on April 2, 2024) Counsel for Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant Zhenya He (Opposing Party): Charles Pok, Esq. (Law Office of Charles Pok & Associates) Counsel for Defendants/Cross-Defendants Maggie Ly Sien aka Maggie Chan, Real Estate Elite Corporation (Moving/Demurring Parties): Fredric W. Trester, Linna Loangkote (Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP) TENTATIVE RULING Cross-Defendants demurrer to the cross-complaint in Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al., 21STCV09634, filed February 14, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. Defendants demurrer to the complaint in Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al., 23AHCV00325, filed April 2, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. The motions to strike are denied as moot. Background On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff/Defendant/Cross-Defendant Zhenya He (He or Plaintiff) filed her complaint in case number 23AHCV00325, He v. Chen. She filed her operative second amended complaint (SAC) on January 10, 2024. On November 28, 2023, He filed a cross-complaint in a related suit, Ku v. He, case number 21STCV09634. The cross-complaint in Ku v. He is functionally identical to the complaint in He v. Chen. Defendants/cross-defendants Maggie Ly Sien (Ly) and Real Estate Elite Corporation (REEC) (together, Defendants) now challenge the functionally identical SAC and cross-complaint, each on the same grounds. Plaintiff alleges as follows in her 2024 SAC and her 2023 cross-complaint, accepted as true for purposes of demurrer and motion to strike (paragraph citations to the SAC unless otherwise noted): Plaintiff purchased the property located at 1400 Circle Drive, San Marino 91108 (the Property) around May 19, 2015. (¶ 17.) In June 2019, Plaintiff registered an LLC, Le Sky Group LLC, and transferred ownership of the Property to the newly-formed LLC. (¶¶ 19, 21.) Plaintiff had loaned defendant Ying Chen a large sum of money in 2017. (¶ 24.) Chen failed to promptly pay her back, and Plaintiff and Chen reached an agreement that Chen would pay the mortgage on the Property until Chen could repay the whole loan to Plaintiff. (¶¶ 24-26.) In December 2020, Chen informed Plaintiff she had repaid the mortgage and suggested to Plaintiff she could help Plaintiff sell the Property if she wanted. (¶ 27, edits to capitalization.) In late 2021, Plaintiff was in China. (¶ 29.) Her real estate agent informed her that the Property had been transferred unbeknownst to [Plaintiff] and Chen was somehow involved with the alleged transfer. (Ibid.) Plaintiff contacted Chen, who informed her the Property had been transferred to a friend and Plaintiff would be paid full market value for it. (Ibid.) The structure on the Property was subsequently torn down, and Plaintiff was never paid. (¶ 30.) As to defendants Maggie Ly Sien (Ly) and Real Estate Elite Corporation (REEC), the moving parties here: according to the SAC, around September and October 2020 defendant Ly, among others, inquired with a representative of Chicago Title Company regarding what documents would be needed in order for Chen to be able to authorize the sale and transfer of Plaintiffs [P]roperty. (¶ 34.) Ly and several of her co-defendants then instigated the creation and filing of a fraudulent Statement of Information as to Le Sky Group LLC, which added Chen as a Manager of the LLC, changed the agent for service of process, and changed the service address. (¶¶ 35-36.) They then created an Operating Agreement for Le Sky Group LLC and forged Plaintiffs signature. (¶ 38.) With their fraudulently-obtained authority over Le Sky Group LLC, the owner of the Property, Ly and her co-defendants then transferred title to the Property without Plaintiffs consent. (¶¶ 39-40.) On February 14, 2024, Ly and REEC demurred to and moved to strike portions of Hes cross-complaint in Ku v. He. Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and Ly and REEC no reply. On April 2, 2024, Ly and REEC demurred to and moved to strike portions from Plaintiffs SAC in He v. Chen. Plaintiff has filed no opposition, and Ly and REEC no reply. The demurrers and motions now come before the Court concurrently in the two related cases. The pleadings and motions are substantially identical, and the Court discusses them all together. Discussion In support of their demurrer, Ly and REEC argue: · The third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, only challenged in the demurrer to the SAC, not to the cross-complaint (one assumes erroneously), fails because Plaintiff has not pled Ly or REEC was her agent, and therefore owed her any fiduciary duty. · The fourth cause of action for slander of title fails because o (1) Plaintiff does not allege Ly or REEC recorded a deed, nor did they, nor can anyone infer they did based on Plaintiffs allegations, because a real estate agent/company does not have a duty to record a deed related to a transaction; and o (2) Plaintiff does not allege any false deed was recorded, even if she alleges the underlying transaction was fraudulent; · The fifth cause of action for conversion fails because it only applies to personal property; and · The seventh cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants received any stolen property. The demurrer is sustained, so the motion to strike is moot. ANALYSIS A. Timeliness; Meeting and Conference A demurrer or motion to strike must be filed within 30 days of being served with a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.40, 435 (b)(1).) Each must be accompanied by the moving partys declaration attesting to a good-faith effort to meet and confer prior to filing. (Id., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) Counsel confirms via declaration that the parties conferred about a timeline for challenging the related pleadings in each case. The demurrer and motion to strike are timely based on the parties agreement, and the parties met and conferred regarding their dispute. (See Loangkote Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.) B. Legal Standard for Demurrer Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) C. Analysis Third Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendants challenge Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in their demurrer to her SAC in He v. Chen, but not their demurrer to her cross-complaint in Ku v. He. The Court assumes this was administrative error; the ruling applies equally to both pleadings. To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty a plaintiff must plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach. (Thomson v. Canyon (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) Plaintiff does not plead that Ly or REEC owed her a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary relationship is any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. (Wolf v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 25, 29.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants owed a duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs based on their profession. The Court is not aware of authority stating that real estate professionals owe a fiduciary duty to the public writ large. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition citing any. Plaintiff has not pled facts showing Defendants owed a duty specifically to her, so she has not stated a claim against them for breach of fiduciary duty. Fourth Cause of Action for Slander of Title The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are (1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. (Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051.) Defendants argue it is not the responsibility of a real estate agent to record or cause to be recorded title relating to real property ... . (MPA, 9:3-4.) The relevance of this argument is unclear. Whether or not it was Defendants responsibility to record a deed has no bearing on whether they actually did so, or whether the deed was true or false. Defendants also argue Plaintiff did not allege Defendants published anything false. On this point, the Court agrees. The general background facts in the SAC and cross-complaint do not contain a specific allegation that Ly or REEC made any publication. The allegations beneath the cause of action itself state generally that Defendants published a false statement. When the joint liability of multiple defendants is unclear, but a complaint fails to distinguish between them, the complaint may fail for uncertainty. (See Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 Cal.3d 901, 909.) Plaintiffs complaint fails for this reason. Without differentiating the nine (9) defendants and their purported involvement with the alleged false deed, none of the defendants can ascertain what she accuses them of, specifically. Plaintiffs claim for slander of title is fatally uncertain as to Ly and REEC. Fifth Cause of Action for Conversion Conversion is generally described as the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. [Citation.] The basic elements of the tort are (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) the defendant's disposition of the property in a manner that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's property rights; and (3) resulting damages. [Citation.] (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 (Fremont).) Plaintiff does not allege Defendants disposed of any of her personal property. Her conversion claim fails. Seventh Cause of Action for Civil Theft To plead a cause of action for civil theft under Penal Code section 496, a plaintiff must allege three elements: (1) property stolen or obtained by theft or fraud; (2) defendants knowledge that it was so obtained; and (3) defendants receipt or possession of the property. (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 126.) Plaintiff accuses Ly and REEC, collectively with their co-defendants, of engaging in a scheme to take her property. The SAC implies that Defendants somehow profited from the scheme. But it does not allege Defendants actually received any stolen property. As a result, Plaintiff has not stated a claim. Defendants demurrer is sustained. D. Leave to Amend Where the complaint is defective, [i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his [or her] complaint&However, if the plaintiff's causes of action is [sic] not viable, leave to amend should not be granted if there is no basis for the court to conclude further amendment would cure the defects. (Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 211, internal quotations omitted.) If the demurrer is sustained, plaintiff has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment. (Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 173, citing Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79). Plaintiff filed no opposition to either demurrer. As a result, she made no effort to demonstrate she can cure her pleading by amendment. She has also amended her complaint twice already, but still fails to state claims against Ly or REEC. It is Plaintiffs burden to show she can amend her complaint to state a claim, and she has not done so. The Court must sustain both demurrers without leave to amend. E. Conclusion Cross-Defendants demurrer to the cross-complaint in Hin Ku v. Zhenya He, et al., 21STCV09634, filed February 14, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. Defendants demurrer to the complaint in Zhenya He v. Ying Chen, et al., 23AHCV00325, filed April 2, 2024, is SUSTAINED in its entirety WITHOUT LEAVE to amend. The motions to strike are denied as moot.

Ruling

MARY ANN OSBORN VS CAMILA MAROJA, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |23SMCV01967

Case Number: 23SMCV01967 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Osborn v. Maroja, et al. CASE NO.: 23SMCV01967 MOTION: Motion to Strike HEARING DATE: 7/19/2024 LEGAL STANDARD Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded].) Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given. (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿in what manner¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿how¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿(Id.) ANALYSIS Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn, individually and as Trustee of the Mary Ann Osborn Trust dated April 2, 2007, moves to strike the punitive damage allegations in Cross-Complainant Camila Marojas Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendant seeks to strike the punitive damages allegations related to the seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Cross-Defendant asserts that, at best, the Cross-Complaint only shows that the parties disagreed regarding ownership of the Property, whether monies paid toward the Property were a loan or a gift, and that the parties had verbal altercations on several occasions. Cross-Defendant asserts that the generic allegations of IIED are insufficient to establish malice as a matter of fact. Cross-Defendant focuses entirely on the generic allegations of the seventh cause of action. However, Cross-Defendant ignores the entirety of the Cross-Complaint, including facts which were expressly incorporated into the seventh cause of action. Punitive damages are available where plaintiff shows that defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Section 3294 defines malice as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Despicable is a powerful term used to describe circ*mstances that are base, vile, or contemptible. (Coll. Hosp. v. Superior Ct. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 704, 726.) The statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of despicable conduct must be found. (Id., emphasis added.) The Cross-Complaint alleges, as a matter of fact, that Cross-Defendant intended to injure Cross-Complainant with her course of conduct. The Cross-Complaint alleges the following facts relevant to the allegations of malice. Cross-Defendant purchased the Subject Property for Cross-Complainant and her family (Dustin and Julian Osborn). (CC ¶¶ 9-10.) Cross-Complainant and her family moved into the Property on April 1, 2020, furnished the Property with wallpaper and bookshelves designed especially for the Property, and treated and considered the Property as their own. (Id.) Cross-Defendant obtained a purchase money loan in the amount of $861,750.00 (the Loan), secured against the Property by a Deed of Trust recorded on March 27, 2020. (CC ¶ 11.) Upon purchase by Cross-Defendant, the Property was acquired on behalf of and in trust for Cross-Complainant and Dustin Osborn. (CC ¶12.) Cross-Defendant transferred title to the Property by Grant Deed dated May 7, 2020, to Dustin F. Osborn and Camila Maroja, Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants, and caused that Grant Deed to be duly recorded on May 27, 2020. (CC ¶ 13.) Dustin Osborn allegedly reimbursed Cross-Defendant. (CC ¶ 14.) Dustin Osborn also rendered management and advising services to Cross-Defendant in exchange for compensation and/or offset of the HOA dues, property taxes, and loan payments. (CC ¶ 15.) Cross-Defendant also made certain lump sum payments as a gift to Cross-Complainant and Dustin Osborn. (¶ 16.) Dustin Osborn died suddenly and unexpectedly on January 6, 2023, whereby Cross-Complainant became the sole owner of the Property. (CC ¶17.) Cross-Defendant ceased paying the monthly HOA dues, property taxes, and Loan payments for the Property. (CC ¶ 18.) Cross-Defendant advised Cross-Complainant that Cross-Complainant would be financially responsible for all future payments on the Loan, monthly HOA dues, and property taxes. (Id.) Cross-Complainant has made or caused to be made all payments regarding the Property. (CC ¶ 19.) Cross-Complainant further alleges that Cross-Defendant began to act erratically and aggressively in her interactions with Cross-Complainant. Cross-Defendant told Cross-Complainant that she hopes her son (Cross-Defendants grandson) dies so that you know how I feel. (CC ¶ 20.) Cross-Defendant claimed that the transfer of the Property was invalid, refused to accept payments on the Loan from Cross-Complainant, claimed that the Loan was in immediate jeopardy of foreclosure if title to the Property was not conveyed back to Cross-Defendant, and threatened to file bankruptcy, among other things, thereby jeopardizing Cross-Complainants home. (Id.) More specifically, on February 14, 2023, Cross-Defendant entered the Property unannounced using a spare key, threatened Cross-Complainant in front of her four-year old son, calling Cross-Complainant a bitch, said that she had only verbal agreements with Dustin Osborn and that nobody would believe Cross-Complainant about the agreements concerning the property, said that the death of a son is much more severe than the death of a husband, and threatened to declare bankruptcy so that Cross-Complainant would lose the Property. (CC ¶21.) On February 16, 2023, Cross-Defendant again entered the Property unannounced, this time threatening to take Cross-Complainants four-year old son to New York, without Cross-Complainants consent, while Cross-Complainant was on a scheduled business trip the following month. (CC ¶ 22.) In response to Cross-Complainants objection, Cross-Defendant said you will be away, what can you do? thereby frightening Cross-Complainant, and subjecting Cross-Complainant to fear loss of control of her four-year old son, and again calling Cross-Complainant, among other inappropriate things, a bitch and "crazy" in front of the four-year old child, causing the four-year old to start crying. (Id.) On February 20, 2023, after learning that Cross-Complainant changed the lock on the door to the Property, Cross-Defendant texted Cross-Complainant, stating, among other things, Dustins salary was never written anywhere. It was only verbal between him and me. There is no proof that we had a contract at all. The loan is all in my name. I have the liability only. I am calling the bank tomorrow to refinance the loan which means payments will be much higher at 7% for y[o]ur mother. (CC ¶23.) Cross-Complainant felt unsafe staying in the Property and no longer comfortable living across the hall from Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn. (CC ¶ 24.) Accordingly, Cross-Complainant accepted out-of-state employment, and began staying elsewhere. (Id.) In March, 2023, Cross-Complainant commenced efforts to sell the Property in order the pay off the Loan and thereby terminate the ongoing monthly payments to maintain the Property. (Id.) On April 21, 2023, Cross-Defendant advised Cross-Complainant that she was going to call the bank on April 27, 2023 and tell the bank to foreclose on the Property. (Id.) Cross-Defendant also interfered with efforts to sell the Property by accosting an interested buyer on May 2, 2023. (CC ¶ 25.) The seventh cause of action incorporates the allegations of conversion and invasion of privacy. On May 30, 2023, without the knowledge or consent of Cross-Complainant, Cross-Defendant entered the Property and removed various personal property belonging to Cross-Complainant. The Personal Property included cherished keepsakes and reminders of Cross-Complainants life with her now-deceased husband, Dustin Osborn, including but not limited to the following: · 3 large framed photographs of a solar eclipse; · Dustin Osborns framed UCLA and Yale diplomas; · A framed certificate from the Court of Appeal with a letter on the back; · Several family pictures including Dustin and Camilas wedding pictures, postcards of Julian Osborn (then 4 years old), polaroid pictures of Julian Osborn, and other family photos; · 2 frames photographs of Dustin Osborn; · A lithograph of a girl and a deer; · A framed picture of Julian Osborn wearing a mushroom t-shirt and red jacket. (CC ¶43.) Cross-Complainant demanded the return of the Personal Property, but Cross-Defendant refused to return the items. (CC ¶44.) Cross-Defendant acted with malice and oppression by taking and thereby converting the Personal Property. (CC ¶45.) Cross-Defendant intended her conversion of the Personal Property to cause Cross-Complainant to suffer harm and emotional distress. (Id.) On February 14, 2023, and again on February 16, 2023, Cross-Defendant Mary Ann Osborn intentionally intruded on Cross-Complainants privacy by entering the Property unannounced and without permission, and in the presence of both Cross-Complainant and Julian Osborn, screamed at, belittled and insulted Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶49.) As a result of this invasion, Cross-Complainant moved out of state, did not share her new address with Cross-Defendant, and took precautions to preserve the confidentiality of her new residential address. (CC ¶ 50.) Despite these efforts, on November 7, 2023, Cross-Defendant entered the mailroom of the condominium complex in which the Property is located, found a package addressed to Cross-Complainant and/or her son, opened the package, examined the contents, and discovered Cross-Complainants new residential address. (CC ¶51.) Cross-Defendants intrusions into the Property and her unauthorized opening of Cross-Complainants mail would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and were in fact highly offensive to Cross-Complainant. (CC ¶ 52.) According to the seventh cause of action itself, Cross-Defendants alleged conduct was outrageous. (CC ¶56.) Cross-Defendant intended to cause Cross-Complainant emotional distress and/or acted with reckless disregard for the probability that Cross-Complainant would suffer emotional distress. (CC ¶57.) As a result, Cross-Complainant suffered severe emotional distress. (CC ¶¶58-59.) Throughout the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainant establishes as a matter of fact that Cross-Defendants conduct was intended to cause Cross-Complainant injury. Conversion may subject a defendant to punitive damages when performed with the requisite malice, oppression or fraud. (Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137, 148.) Cross-Defendant does not explain how the above factual allegations are insufficient to support the pled intentional harm. Taken as a whole, a reasonable person could conclude that the above course of conduct was intended to cause injury and/or emotional distress. Further, these acts are independent of the alleged breach of contract claim. As such, the Cross-Complaint establishes sufficient facts in support of the allegations of malice for pleading purposes. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Ruling

GLADSTONE, et al. vs. MEISSNER, et al.

Jul 18, 2024 |CVCV21-0197823

GLADSTONE, ET AL. VS. MEISSNER, ET AL.Case Number: CVCV21-0197823This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacatedby the Court’s order dated April 18, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exemptfrom case disposition time standards. It appears that neither side has posted jury fees, which aspreviously noted in the Court’s October 23, 2023 Order, is deemed a waiver of the right to a jury.The parties are ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates.J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF